This book is a critical exposition of multiple facets of Ludwig Wittgenstein's thoughts on ethics and religion. The book first brings out foundations of Wittgenstein's views. Then, it deals with various issues of current debates in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, such as: the notion of transcendental ethics. the dichotomy between fact and value. the distinction between religious and superstitious beliefs. the notion of happiness and human being. discussions on Fideism. whether Wittgenstein's methodology was Christian or Jewish. Wittgenstein's religious thoughts in (...) the context of logical positivism and Habermas. The book is useful not only for students of philosophy and theology but also for a lay reader who is interested in an in-depth analysis of the realm of meta-ethics and religious philosophy of language. (shrink)

The book is full of insights for undergraduate, post-graduate and research students of Philosophy and all those who are interested in the Philosophy of religion and ethics of Wittgenstein.

No one in twentieth-century analytic philosophy was more preoccupied with the issues of ethics and religion than Ludwig Wittgenstein. In an age when religion has remained a prominent force, contrary to what some would have thought a hundred years ago, it is not surprising to see a book on Wittgenstein's concern with ethics and religion by a group of Indian philosophers. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Ethics and Religion, edited by Kali Charan Pandey—a collection of fifteen essays, some of which were (...) presented at a conference—is divided into three sections; the first provides a broad outline while the other two deal with the issues of ethics and religion, respectively. The editor has written a detailed introduction to the .. (shrink)

This inspiring and practical manual shows how applying yoga's timeless principals to modern life can lead to radiant health and inner peace. Using engaging anecdotes from her students and her own challenges on the path, author Kali Om shares accessible and simple tools for self-transformation that have a deep and lasting impact.

Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicited by context cues, and insensitive to short-term changes in goals: therefore they are sometimes irrational. But even where habitual responses are rational, it can seem as if they are nevertheless not done for reasons. For, on a common understanding of habitual behaviour, agents’ intentions do not play any role in the coming about of such responses. This paper discusses under what conditions we can (...) say that habitual responses are, after all, done for reasons. We show how the idea that habitual behaviour cannot be understood as ‘acting for reasons’ stems from a widely but often implicitly held theoretical framework: the causal theory of action. We then propose an alternative, Anscombean understanding of intentional action, which can account for habitual responses being done for reasons. (shrink)

This book explores classic philosophical questions regarding the phenomenon of weakness of will or ‘akrasia’: doing A, even though all things considered, you judge it best to do B. Does this phenomenon really exist and if so, how should it be explained? Nacht van Descartes -/- The author provides a historical overview of some traditional answers to these questions and addresses the main question: how does the phenomenon of 'going against your own judgment' relate to the idea that we are (...) rational beings? She elaborates on the notion of rational agency and shows how different types of behaviour express or fail to express our rational agency. This leads to the speculation of what is needed for akratic action to be free action. -/- A novel position is developed, stating that certain widespread philosophical accounts of free action must conclude that 'going against your own judgment' is necessarily unfree. This also requires a reflection on possible implications for moral responsibility. Would it mean that people cannot be held accountable for irrational behaviour? -/- Kalis offers insight on whether everyday irrational behaviour differs from irrational behaviour occurring in the context of psychiatric dysfunction, and develops a view on how we should understand ourselves when we do something other than what we judge best. -/- Written for philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists interested in issues of irrationality and philosophy of action, this is an indispensable book for both professionals and students interested in interdisciplinary endeavours in the science of mind and behaviour. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 94 Heft: 1 Seiten: 234-275.

Gilbert Ryle’s account of perception has not become widely known. Moreover, most of the responses to his account have been critical. Ryle’s method was to analyze our everyday use of perception verbs such as ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’, in order to argue that perception is a skill that we learn by doing. His critics concluded that by focusing on the use of perception verbs, Ryle dodged all central problems of perception. The current article aims to rebut this conclusion, by showing how (...) Ryle’s work on perception builds on his logical-geographical method. That method leads Ryle to the conclusion that perceptual skill is a form of knowing how. Perception recipes, defined as shared criteria for correct use of perception verbs, display the normative structure of this knowledge. Although this analysis raises questions of its own, it shows that Ryle was in fact engaging seriously with core philosophical questions about the nature of perception. (shrink)

This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework, focusing on option generation as an aspect that has been neglected by previous models. In the (...) main body of this article, we review how both philosophy and neuropsychiatry have provided accounts of dysfunction in each decision-making stage, as well as where these accounts can be integrated. Also, the neural underpinnings of dysfunction in the three different stages are discussed. We conclude by discussing advantages and limitations of our integrative approach. (shrink)

What attitude does someone manifesting implicit bias really have? According to the default representationalist picture, implicit bias involves having conflicting attitudes (explicit versus implicit) with respect to the topic at hand. In opposition to this orthodoxy, dispositionalists argue that attitudes should be understood as higher-level dispositional features of the person as a whole. Following this metaphysical view, the discordance characteristic of implicit bias shows that someone’s attitude regarding the topic at hand is not-fully-manifested or ‘in-between’. However, so far few representationalists (...) have been convinced by dispositionalist arguments, largely because dispositionalism cannot provide explanations in terms of underlying processes. We argue that if dispositionalism wants to be a genuine contender, it should make clear what it has to offer in terms of understanding of implicit bias. As a concrete proposal, we combine dispositionalist metaphysics with the idea that our normative practices of attitude ascription partly determine what it means to have an attitude. We show that such regulative dispositionalism can account for two prominent normative features of implicit bias. We conclude by suggesting that in order to engage in a meaningful debate with representationalism, dispositionalists might have to put the question ‘what counts as a good explanation?’ back on the table. (shrink)

Mental states in psychology Many of our thoughts, emotions and motivations have intentional content: they are ‘about’ something. In this paper I present my VENI research project, which starts from the observation that the everyday practice of empirical psychological research is built on the idea that mental states have content. However, empirical psychology lacks a clear view on how mental content should be understood and how mental states could be causally efficacious in virtue of their content. I focus on mental (...) states that play a role in psychiatric symptomatology, and develop an interpretivist answer to these questions. I also offer some suggestions showing how an interpretivist notion of mental content could be used in empirical research on psychiatric symptoms. (shrink)

In the wake of the brave voices of the #metoo movement, Buddhist responses to sexual abuse have led to important questions about Buddhist sexual ethics and the female consort in Tibetan cultures. One issue raised by current debates is the question of who is an appropriate consort, a discourse that has historical precedent. These debates highlight the gaps left by the understudied history of consorts in Tibetan tantric communities. This research addresses that history through a study of female consort discourse (...) in key scriptures of the Great Perfection from the fourteenth century. The text studied is The Ḍākki’s Path and Fruit, which is part of a corpus known as The Seminal Heart of the Ḍākinī. The scriptures are analyzed in terms of taxonomic discourse, interpreted with attention to structures of knowledge production as described by Foucault. It addresses the discursive transformations that facilitated the inclusion of women in the androcentric world of esoteric Tibetan Buddhism. Overall, the argument is made that this scripture sheds light on how knowledge of women and sexuality was constructed in a web of ever-changing, contradicting, competing discourses that reflect an ambivalent misogyny that simultaneously promoted and subjugated women. (shrink)

Teachings of the various leaders of the Radhasoami Satsang.

This study investigates what professional caregivers working in nursing homes consider to be a good life for residents suffering from dementia. Ten caregivers were interviewed; special attention was paid to the way in which they deal with conflicting values. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed qualitatively according to the method of grounded theory. The results were compared with those from a similar, earlier study on ideals found in mission statements of nursing homes. The concepts that were mentioned by most interviewed (...) participants as important for a good life were ‘peace and quiet’, ‘going along with subjective experience’ and ‘no enforcement: the way the resident wants it’. A considerable overlap was found between the interviews and the mission statements; however, when compared with the mission statements, the interviews put less emphasis on individuality and on giving meaning, and more on offering residents pleasant activities. When faced with conflicting values, caregivers tend to make pragmatic and more or less intuitive decisions. Although this has its merits, it may be desirable to stimulate conscious reflection regarding conflict between different values. (shrink)

Traditionally, self-control is conceptualized in terms of internal processes such as willpower or motivational mechanisms. These processes supposedly explain how agents manage to exercise self-control or, in other words, how they act on the basis of their best judgment in the face of conflicting motivation. Against the mainstream view that self-control is a mechanism or set of mechanisms realized in the brain, several authors have recently argued for the inclusion of situated factors in our understanding of self-control. In this paper, (...) we review such recent attempts from the perspective of situated accounts of cognition and argue that even though these accounts integrate situational features, they ultimately still rely on an orthodox, neurocentric view of self-control. Instead, we will argue that in order to develop a really situated account it is necessary to radically rethink what self-control is. Building on recent work on extended skill, we will develop an outline of a really situated account of self-control. (shrink)

Background: Medical tourism, thought of as patients seeking non-emergency medical care outside of their home countries, is a growing industry worldwide. Canadians are amongst those engaging in medical tourism, and many are helped in the process of accessing care abroad by medical tourism brokers - agents who specialize in making international medical care arrangements for patients. As a key source of information for these patients, brokers are likely to play an important role in communicating the risks and benefits of undergoing (...) surgery or other procedures abroad to their clientele. This raises important ethical concerns regarding processes such as informed consent and the liability of brokers in the event that complications arise from procedures. The purpose of this article is to examine the language, information, and online marketing of Canadian medical tourism brokers' websites in light of such ethical concerns. Methods: An exhaustive online search using multiple search engines and keywords was performed to compile a comprehensive directory of English-language Canadian medical tourism brokerage websites. These websites were examined using thematic content analysis, which included identifying informational themes, generating frequency counts of these themes, and comparing trends in these counts to the established literature. Results: Seventeen websites were identified for inclusion in this study. It was found that Canadian medical tourism broker websites varied widely in scope, content, professionalism and depth of information. Three themes emerged from the thematic content analysis: training and accreditation, risk communication, and business dimensions. Third party accreditation bodies of debatable regulatory value were regularly mentioned on the reviewed websites, and discussion of surgical risk was absent on 47% of the websites reviewed, with limited discussion of risk on the remaining ones. Terminology describing brokers' roles was somewhat inconsistent across the websites. Finally, brokers' roles in follow up care, their prices, and the speed of surgery were the most commonly included business dimensions on the reviewed websites. Conclusion: Canadian medical tourism brokers currently lack a common standard of care and accreditation, and are widely lacking in providing adequate risk communication for potential medical tourists. This has implications for the informed consent and consequent safety of Canadian medical tourists. (shrink)

As we all know, people often do not do what would be the rational thing to do. Both psychologists and philosophers have long been interested in explaining this aspect of the human condition. Also, the relation between everyday irrationality and pathological breakdowns of rationality is a familiar topic of discussion in psychiatry. It is not merely the failures themselves that present interesting questions; there is also the hope that, by understanding when and why we violate rational norms, we might get (...) a firmer grasp on what it means to meet such norms, and thus gain a deeper understanding of the rational capacities of human beings. The capacity we focus on herein is our capacity for practical rationality... (shrink)

In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral judgments can help us make better moral judgments. Discussions about moral development and improvement are often framed in terms of the question of which mental processes have a better chance of leading to good moral judgments. However, few studies elaborate on the question of what makes a moral judgment a good moral judgment. This article examines what is needed to answer questions of moral improvement and development. (...) It distinguishes 3 types of claims that are at stake: descriptive claims, metaethical claims, and normative claims. To find out what makes certain moral judgments better than others, one needs to have insight in the psychological processes and capacities underlying moral judgment formation. However, one also needs to address the question of what makes a moral judgment justified, and this in turn requires a view on the nature of moral goodness and on the question of what makes a judgment moral at all. The author discusses possible ways in which philosophical theories in the areas of metaethics and normative ethics can contribute to the answering of such questions. Also, she provides concrete suggestions for doing interdisciplinary research that is able to address those questions in moral psychology that have both normative and descriptive aspects. (shrink)

Vedānta endeavours to base itself essentially on the facts of experience—in the fullest sense of the term. It recognizes the occurrence of everyday experience and the so-called fact of evil, but it refuses to view them as real. The real, it says, like Hegel, does not exist, and that which exists is not real. Evil is only an “existent"—as all this Samsara is—but not the ultimate Real. But it will be at once objected that if evil is an appearance, a (...) Maya, why should this appearance appear at all? If it has no foundation in reality, how and why does it occur at all? Further, how can anything be known as real unless it should appear ? Reality must appear. (shrink)

In faith and practice, Pentecostals put emphasis on practical issues as well as spiritual experience in their theological understanding and doctrinal teachings. The Pentecostals take their doctrine from certain empirical events. One of the spiritual experiences often underlined is the baptism of the Holy Spirit. In interpreting the Book of Acts, Pentecostals tend to emphasise the theological character of the narratives and seldom their historical uniqueness. That is why Pentecostals stress the normative theological intent of the historical record for contemporary (...) Christian experience. This article therefore examines critically Pentecostal paradigm of the baptism of the Holy Spirit, deriving examples from the Acts of the Apostles. It is concluded that the practice of the baptism of the Holy Spirit carried out by Christians today, arguably, has no biblical basis. This is because, there is nowhere the Bible commands people to seek baptism in the Holy Spirit. The observation is that, all the events or experiences of Christians baptised in the Holy Spirit in Acts are not necessarily universal normative for every Christian and for this reason, there is no need to be dogmatic.Contribution: This article challenges the practice of the baptism of the Holy Spirit in church today. This study supports the fact that the baptism of the Holy Spirit is not a universal experience for every Christians and there is no need to be dogmatised. (shrink)

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting (...) that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity. (shrink)

According to Oude Maatman (2020), our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al., 2019) that symptom networks are irreducible because they rely on folk psychological descriptions, threatens to undermine the main achievements of the network approach. In this article, we take up Oude Maatman’s challenge and develop an argument showing in what sense folk psychological concepts describe features of reality, and what it means to say that folk psychology is a causal language.

Do Heidegger-teabags give philosophy a bad name? An essay about philosophy for the general public Among many academic philosophers, philosophy for the general public has a bad reputation. In this paper I give an overview of the main points of criticism, and use these to develop a positive account of what good philosophy for the general public could be. As a first step towards such an account, I outline different views on how philosophy for the general public can relate to (...) academic philosophy. Subsequently, I argue that what makes philosophy for the general public ‘good’, is just what makes philosophical work in general ‘good’: good philosophical work has a philosophical aim, employs philosophical methods and employs these methods in a sound way. Finally I argue that communicability of philosophical ideas should not be seen as a bonus feature but as the sine qua non of philosophical thinking: if academic philosophy paid more attention to communicability, we might not even need a distinct discipline of philosophy for the general public. I conclude with some concrete suggestions for improving such communicability. (shrink)

According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a notion of intention seems to be motivated by the widespread assumption that (...) intentions should be understood as internal states with representational content. This assumption goes against two main tenets of ecological psychology: its anti-representationalist stance and its claim that perception is direct (in the sense of not being mediated by inferential processes). Ecological psychology thus needs a different answer to the question what intentions are. In this paper, we aim to show that Elizabeth Anscombe’s theory of intention can be fruitfully brought to bear on an ecological theory of agency. We will argue that Anscombe’s account can meet the two challenges of bringing intentions into the framework of ecological psychology: firstly it can explain what intentions are, if not representational states; and, secondly, it can show how our perception of affordances is guided by intention without undermining the idea of direct perception. (shrink)

In recent years, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning have made a ‘social turn’: in both disciplines it is now common to reject the traditional picture of reasoning as a solitary intellectual exercise in favour of the idea that reasoning is a social activity driven by social aims. According to the most prominent social account, Mercier and Sperber’s interactionist theory, this implies that reasoning is not a normative activity. As they argue, in producing reasons we are not trying to ‘get (...) things right’; instead our aims are to justify ourselves and persuade others to accept our views. I will argue that even if interactionism has played a crucial role in bringing about the ‘social turn’ in our thinking about reasoning, it does not convince in its claim that reasoning is not a normative activity. Moreover, I argue that it is in fact perfectly possible to understand reasoning as a social tool that is also aimed at getting things right. I will propose that Gilbert Ryle’s conceptualization of reasoning as ‘didactic discourse’ offers one possible way to understand reasoning as both social and normative activity, and that as such his ideas could be of great value for the social turn in our thinking about reasoning. (shrink)